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A CRITIQUE OF LA WYERS' ETHICS IN AN
ADVERSARY SYSTEMt
William R. Meagher*
Monroe Freedman's book is largely a reiteration of his unorthodox
views, previously aired in various law reviews and other professional
publications, regarding the ethical standards that should govern the
conduct of the trial advocate. Since his positions contradict the
behavioral principles codified in two publications of the American
Bar Association-the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Standards Relating to the Defense Function-the author adopts the
apologetic strategy of impugning both the credibility and the viability of these precepts in order to justify his contrary stance and to
clear the way for its general acceptance.
What ethical norms does he advocate? Well, take for example his
position in a hypothetical regarding the use by criminal defense
counsel of perjured testimony known to him to be false. A robbery
occurs at 16th and P Streets at 11:00 P.M. Defendant, although
innocent, is charged with the crime. At first, defendant denies that
he was in the vicinity, but persuaded by counsel to tell all upon
counsel's assurance that he will not be prejudiced, defendant admits he was at 15th and P Streets at 10:55 P.M. on the night of the
crime, but asserts that he was walking east, away from the scene of
the crime. At the trial, one prosecution witness falsely identifies
defendant as the robber. A second prosecution witness correctly
places defendant at 15th and P Streets at 10:55 P.M., but crossexamination casts some doubt upon the witness' reliability. Defendant then insists upon taking the stand to deny the mistaken
identification of him as the robber, and also to deny the truthful
testimony placing him at 15th and P Streets five minutes before
the crime. In these circumstances what are counsel's professional
responsibilities?
t Lawyer's Ethics is an Adversary System. By Monroe H. Freedman. New York: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.. 1975. Pp. xiii, 270. $12.50.
After considering the highly controversial nature of Mr. Freedman's book and the reviewer's
vigorous disagreement with many of Mr. Freedman's notions, the Editors decided that this
review merits a more prominent place than the traditional, terminal location of book reviews.
* Member of the New York Bar. Mr. Meagher received his A.B. and LL.B. cum laude from
Fordham University. Mr. Meagher is counsel to Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, New
York City, and an adjunct professor at Fordham University School of Law.
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The author answers:'
In my opinion, the attorney's obligation in such a situation would be to advise
the client that the proposed testimony is unlawful, but to proceed in the
normal fashion in presenting the testimony and arguing the case to the jury
if the client makes the decision to go forward. Any other course would be a
betrayal of the assurances of confidentiality given by the attorney in order
to induce the client to reveal everything, however damaging it might appear.

A substantial portion of the book is an attempt to justify this
position. Freedman first analyzes what he terms the trial lawyer's
"trilemma," which arises from three conflicting professional obligations: first, in order to prepare the defense properly, counsel must
know all that his client knows; second, counsel must keep confidential all that his client tells him; and third, counsel, as an officer of
the court, must be candid with the court. These obligations are
thrown into conflict by the client's exercise of his "right" to testify
when both he and his attorney know that the testimony which he is
about to give is false. Freedman resolves the conflict in favor of the
perjurious client by making paramount the attorney's "obligation"
of "confidentiality," and subordinating all other professional obligations he may have. However, this position, if adopted, would involve
the attorney in serious ethical and even criminal difficulties.
First of all, in the case supposed, the client has committed perjury' and obstruction of justice.' The attorney has probably suborned this perjury and conspired with the client to commit perjury.
Certainly he has facilitated the crime.' Although Freedman suggests
that defense counsel lacks the criminal intent required for subornation, the presence of this intent appears from counsel's deliberate
elicitation of the client's false testimony and his argument in summation based upon it.'
Quite apart from his criminal involvement, the attorney's conduct violates the Code of Professional Responsibility. Disciplinary
1. M.
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Rule 7-102(A)(4) of the Code expressly forbids counsel, in his
representation of a client, to "[k]nowingly use perjured testimony
or false evidence." The author finds the word "knowingly" to be
obscure and ambiguous, because it is not indicated whether
"subjective" or "objective" knowledge is intended, However, this
theoretical obscurity is irrelevant to the case hypothesized since
the lawyer's foreknowledge of the client's perjury is one of the facts
assumed.'
Indeed, this very knowledge releases the attorney from the obligation of confidentiality.' Once the attorney no longer has the
obligation of confidentiality, he becomes duty-bound not know6. The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer, in his representation of a
client, to:
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal.
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.
(5) Knowingly make a false statment of law or fact.
(6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or it is
obvious that the evidence is false.
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent.
(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary
Rule.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY D.R. 7-102(A)(3) -(8) (emphasis added).
Freedman contends that the Code of Professional Responsibility employs "the concept of
knowing in a vague and undifferentiated way." FREEDMAN 57. He concludes that "[als a
result [of the Code of Professional Responsibility's use of the concept of knowing], we are
left without any significant guidance in drawing possible distinctions between criminal and
civil litigation, and among different kinds of conduct that might be improper." Id. Inconsistently, at another place, he criticizes those lawyers who claim they never really "know"
whether or not a client is guilty, and those others who "don't want to know the facts." in
any event, it is extremely doubtful that any member of the bar reading Disciplinary Rules 7102(A)(3)-(8) of the Code of Professional Responsibility in good faith would find the words
"knowingly" or "knows" too obscure and vague for guidance.
7. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3) of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
a lawyer may reveal "[tihe intention of his client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime." Freedman contends that this obligation of "disclosure of the
[client's] confidence is only permissible, not mandatory." FREEDMAN 6. A footnote to Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3) states:
ABA Opinion 314 (1965) indicates that a lawyer must disclose even the confidences of
his clients if "the facts in the attorney's possession indicate beyond reasonable doubt
that a crime will be committed."
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBlLrry D.R. 4-101(C)(3) n.16. It must be noted that the
sole purpose of the footnotes to the Code of Professional Responsibility was "to enable the
reader to relate the provisions of. . . [the] Code to the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics
..... " Preamble to id. n.1.
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ingly to use perjured testimony, even though his refusal may result
in revealing the client's imminent perjury.' In short, the seal of
secrecy is broken to enable counsel to meet his obligation to reveal,
and possibly to prevent, the client's false swearing.
While it is true, as the author states, that the defendant in a
criminal case has a " 'right to tell his story,' "I it is equally true that
he has no right to testify falsely. The defendant's constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination secures to him the right to refuse
to testify without any prejudicial inferences from such refusal, or
comment about it; but if he elects to take the stand he must, in
accordance with his oath, "testify to the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth."
As a practical matter, in the case supposed, the active involvement of counsel in the client's perjury seems unavoidable if, as the
author suggests, the attorney is "to proceed in the normal fashion
in presenting the testimony .
".1.."0
Except in emergency situations, the experienced trial lawyer will not put his witnesses on the
stand without preparation. This customarily involves not only a
review of the direct examination, but also a preview of the questions
that are likely to be asked on cross-examination and how the
witness is to handle them. When the testimony to be given on direct
is known to counsel to be perjurious, and the answers to be given
on cross must therefore be designed to conceal and maintain this
perjury, testimonial preparation of the client inevitably involves
counsel in the creation and preparation of evidence which he knows
to be false in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility."'
Freedman concedes that there is some distinction between "perjury by the criminal defendant, who has the right to take the stand,
8.

See ABA

9.

FREEDMAN

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIIUTY D.R. 7-102(A)(4).

31.

10. Id.
11. Here the author is inconsistent. While contending that the defense lawyer may ethically put his perjurious client on the stand and question him as he would any truthful witness,
he considers clearly unethical the pre-trial preparation of a client's testimony involving the
lawyer's "actively participating in ... a factual defense that is obviously perjurious." Id. at
73. Indeed, it is hard to perceive in what respect the interrogation of the perjurious client in
a courtroom is not greater participation in the client's perjury than his interrogation in the
office of his attorney. The author's footnoted "distinction" between active participation in a
false defense and "accepting a client's decision to commit perjury, and presenting that perjury to the court," id. at 73 n.*, is so flimsy as to be intellectually invisible.
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and perjury by collateral witnesses"'" who do not have that right.
That is to say, while permitting the client to perjure himself is
obligatory, the use of a perjurious witness may not be permissible.
But, as a practical matter, it is likely that once the defendant has
told his perjurious story, he will insist on perjurious corroboration.
Suppose in the case at hand, that defendant, after testifying that
he was not in the vicinity of the crime at the time of the robbery, is
asked on cross-examination where he was at that hour. Defendant
has t6 place himself somewhere; and so he lies that he was at home
with his wife and mother watching the eleven o'clock news. Suppose
further that he then insists on having his wife and mother called as
witnesses to support his false alibi. It is difficult to see how defense
counsel, if under an obligation of confidentiality, could refuse to
place the wife and mother on the stand, elicit their perjurious testimony, and use it effective in summation. Indeed, if the author were
the attorney, he would appear to have no compunction about concealing their perjury for he says: 3
Certainly a spouse or parent would be acting under the same human compulsion as a defendant, and I find it difficult to imagine myself denouncing my
client's spouse or parent as a perjuror and, thereby, denouncing my client as
well.

Thus, defense counsel's initial submission to his client's insistence
on testifying falsely enmeshes him in an ever-expanding network of
perjuries.
The author laments that critics of his postion do not offer any
practical guidance as to what defense counsel should do to avoid the
ethical difficulties thus presented. To the suggestion that counsel
withdraw from the case, Freedman responds that "[iln terms of
professional ethics, the practice of withdrawing

. . .

is difficult to

defend, since the identical perjured testimony will ultimately be
presented."'" This, of course, assumes that another advocate can
readily be found who will go along with the client's forensic charade
-a sad commentary on the "ethics" of the criminal bar. The further
suggestion that by withdrawing, the attorney loses the opportunity
to discourage the client from presenting the perjured testimony is
12.

FREEDMAN 32

13. Id. at 32.
14. Id. at 33.

(footnote omitted).
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facetious since in the case supposed the attorney has already advised the client that the proposed testimony is unlawful and nevertheless the client has made the "decision to go forward."
It is next objected, by the author, that where the defense lawyer
must seek the court's permission to withdraw (as in the case of
court-appointed counsel) he can do so only by stating he has "an
ethical problem," thereby raising an implication of the client's guilt
".1..'5This,
in "gross violation of the obligation of confidentiality .
of course, assumes that the obligation of confidentiality continues
despite the client's proposed perjury and the attorney's ethical
duty to prevent or reveal it. And it should be observed that any
resulting prejudice to the defense occasioned by the lawyer's withdrawal is caused not by counsel's violation of any rights of the
client, but by the client's insistence on committing a penal wrong.
This pervasive obligation of confidentiality, the author further
argues, makes unacceptable the "solution" of the American Bar
Association Standards Relating to the Defense Function, which is
to let the client testify in narrative form without counsel's interrogation or reference to the testimony in summation.' 6 But here
again, any inference of the defendant's guilt arising from this procedure is caused not by the lawyer's abstention, but by the client's
wrongful insistence upon defending against one alleged crime by
committing another.
In this connection, Freedman emphasizes that "jurors assume
that the defendant's lawyer knows the truth about the case . . .
[and] the jury will frequently judge the defendant by drawing inferences from the attorney's conduct in the case."'" But this is all
the more reason why the trial advocate's presentation of perjurious
testimony is to be avoided. In presuming that the lawyer knows the
truth about the case, the jurors naturally assume that his interrogation of his client and witnesses is designed to elicit the truth
that the lawyer knows. Thus, the interrogating lawyer impresses
the testimony he elicits with the stamp of his personal credibility.
Indeed, the questions asked, the tone and inflection of counsel's
voice, his gestures, facial expressions, and his total demeanor
15.
16.

Id, at 34.
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION §

7.7(c) in ABA,

OF JUSTICE 133 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS].
17. FREEDMAN 37.

THE ADMINISTRATION
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must, in order to be psychologically effective, impress the court
and jury with his belief in the veracity of his evidence and the
merits of his client's case. When counsel, behind this facade of
sincerity, presents falsehood as truth, he prostitutes himself and
perverts the judicial process.
Therefore, it must be accepted as a first principle that under no
circumstances may counsel present evidence known to him to be
false in any case, criminal or civil. It is the departure from this basic
absolute that leads to the "trilemma" which the author finds inescapable. This "trilemma" actually need not arise: it can be avoided
by a clear understanding at the very threshold of the lawyer-client
relationship regarding the ethical limits beyond which counsel may
not and will not go. Then the client will have no right to claim later
that he was deceived by promises of confidentiality to make prejudicial disclosures which the attorney is required at all costs to conceal.
In this connection, it should be observed that trial counsel has the
professional responsibility (to which Freedman does not refer) to
take charge of the conduct of the case, certainly as far as procedural matters are concerned;'" and while the client should be kept
advised of the procedures to be followed, the final decision regarding their adoption should rest with counsel.'" The layman-client
has no more business telling his trial lawyer how the case is to be
tried than the layman-patient has any business telling his surgeon how the operation is to be performed. On the other hand, the
attorney abdicates his proper function when he puts the client in
charge. The lawyer's professional control of the case necessarily
includes the power to decide whether or not the client is to testify
and what witnesses are to be called. If the client understands this
at the very outset, the author's "trilemma" need hardly arise.
Should the client decline to give this control, counsel should refuse
20
to take the case.
18. ABA

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBluTY

E.C. 7-7. It should be noted that these

procedural matters must arise "[i]n certain areas of legal representation not affecting the
merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client ....
Id. Counsel must
exercise his discretion in such matters "in a manner consistent with the best interests of his
client." Id. E.C. 7-9.
19. Id. E.C. 7-7. These instances must be distinguished from situations where only the
client has the right to decide on the course of action. See id. If a client is lax in making a
decision where counsel is not free to do so unilaterally, counsel "ought to initiate this decisionmaking function .
Id. E.C. 7-8.
20. Discussion of this subject is concluded by the author with a reference to a 1972 survey
of lawyers in the District of Columbia said to show that "when asked what to do when the
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Turning to a related topic, Freedman apparently sees inconsistency between the American Bar Association's condemnation of
presenting perjured testimony"t and its non-disapproval of crossexamining a witness who the cross-examiner knows is telling the
truth." He puts the case of the defense lawyer who, after being told
by the defendant that he did in fact rape the prosecutrix as charged,
attacks her credibility on cross-examination by attempting to get
admissions of her consensual sexual intercourse with other men.
Freedman deplores the rule that while counsel may not ethically put
the defendant on the stand to deny the rape, he may ethically crossexamine the rape victim in an attempt to impair her credibility.23
In both cases, he says, "the lawyer participates in misleading the
finder of fact."2 However, there is a well-recognized difference between the two situations. In eliciting perjurious testimony, counsel
is deliberately using false evidence, known to him to be false; and
if the client is guilty, such use is intended to bring about a miscarriage of justice by an unjustified acquittal. On the other hand, in
cross-examining the truthful witness, counsel is not seeking to make
the witness lie, but rather to elicit true facts which the jurors may
consider in determining the credibility of the witness' testimony.
client indicates an intention to commit perjury, 95% indicated that they would call the
defendant, and 90% ..-.
that they would question the witness in the normal fashion."
FREEDMAN 38. Significantly, "virtually all," id. at 39, those interviewed insisted on anonymity. In any event, if this survey accurately reflects the consensus of the District of Columbia
bar, the criminal lawyers practicing in that jurisdiction have indeed become criminal.
21.

ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIRILrrY D.R. 7-102(A)(4).

22. ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS §7.6(b). See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
D.R.7-101(A)(1).
23. In rape cases, defense counsel has the obligation to cross-examine the prosecutrix as
to her prior consensual sex relations in order to establish a statutory defense. Under the Model
Penal Code it is a defense to a prosecution for rape "that the alleged victim had, prior to the
time of the offense charged, engaged promiscuously in sexual relations with others." MODEL
PENAL CODE §213.6(4) (1962); see J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 200 (3d ed. 1940). But see N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW
§ 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1975). Whether this evidence should be made admissible is a debatable public policy question. Recently an Advisory Group on the Law of Rape (including
two women High Court judges) recommended to Britain's Home Secretary that such evidence
should be inadmissible. Weinraub, In Britain a Move is Afoot to Update Laws on Rape, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 13, 1975, at 22, col. 4.
24. FREEDMAN 45. Freedman considers counsel's participation in cross-examination of the
truthful witness more questionable than his participation in the direct examination of the
lying client, because on direct examination only non-leading questions may be asked while
on cross-examination the lawyer takes an active aggressive role in asking leading questions.
This seems a tenuous distinction at best.
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Moreover, when counsel calls a perjurious witness he fraudulently
vouches for the credibility of that witness; he does not similarly
vouch for the credibility of opposing witnesses, whose testimony he
has the obligation to test by legitimate cross-examination.25
In any event, the author ultimately concludes that the criticized
cross-examination is both permissible and required; but he suggests
that the lawyer who finds presentation of the consensual intercourse
defense personally unconscionable may decline to accept the defense 'of rape cases. Peculiarly, he makes no similar suggestion to the
lawyer whose client insists on presenting a perjurious defense.
When the author comes to lecture the prosecutor on his ethical
responsibilities, he ascends a loftier and sounder platform. All will
agree that a prosecutor may not abuse the powers of his office;
that his duty is to protect the innocent as well as to convict the
guilty; and that even in convicting the guilty he must be meticulous
in his avoidance of improper means." Also well taken is the author's
position that prosecutors should avoid press conferences announcing
indictments, with the attendant fanfare of television and radio coverage, leading oftentimes to prejudgment of the accused person's
guilt.
However, the author's defense orientation impels him to favor
other prosecutorial strictures that seem excessively stringent. For
example, in considering the ethical standards that should control
the prosecutor's investigatory function, singling out one individual
as a target for inquiry is condemned. Thus, Attorney General
Robert Kennedy is criticized for his "get Hoffa" campaign, although it resulted in Hoffa's criminal convictions. The criticism is
put on the ground that the probe of Hoffa's activities had the
appearance of a private vendetta arising from a rumored Hoffa to
Kennedy personal insult. Applying the American Bar Association's
25. In the suppositious case the situation would be quite different if defense counsel,
having no information or proof that the prosecutrix had prior sexual intercourse, were to
cross-examine her in such a way as to indicate to the jury his possession of such information.
This illustration defuses Freedman's charge that the organized bar, in its approach to ethical
problems, takes the position that "[cross-examination . . . is good, and therefore any
lawyer, under any circumstances and regardless of the consequences, can properly impeach
a witness through cross-examination." Id. at 45-46.
26. Examples of "improper means" include, but are not limited to, withholding exculpatory evidence, suppressing evidence that weakens his case, and improper cross-examination
designed to destroy a defense witness who he knows to be telling the truth.
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Standard that "[a] prosecutor should avoid the appearance of a
conflict of interest with respect to his official duties," 7 Freedman
contends that Kennedy was ethically required to-withdraw from the
Hoffa case and to seek the appointment of a special prosecutor. This
would seem far too heady and impractical a nostrum; it would open
wide the door to baseless claims of apparent conflicts of interest
and applications for the appointment of scores of special prosecutors, both state and federal, entailing heavy expense and interminable delay."
Wholly apart from the special Kennedy-Hoffa situation, many
crimes, especially conspiracies, would go unproved without the testimony of at least one of the principals. More often than not, this
principal must be made a defendant before he can be made a prosecution witness: he must be singled out for intensive investigation in
the hope of unearthing facts warranting his indictment either for the
conspiracy or a wholly unrelated crime. That indictment, if obtained, may then be used as pressure to make the defendant talk.
Thus, it is sometimes necessary to make a suspect a person to be
"gotten" in order that a good case against others may be made."
What ethical standards should govern the prosecutor in deciding
whether to seek an indictment? Surely, he should proceed with the
utmost caution, for an indictment brands the defendant a searing
stigma that even later acquittal cannot entirely extirpate. But the
author would go so far as to forbid the prosecutor to obtain an
indictment unless he personally is "satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused is guilty."30 If this restriction were imposed,
few indeed would have the courage to assume the scrupulous ethical
burdens of a prosecutor, and few indictments indeed would be returned. Furthermore, the substitution of the prosecutor's personal
opinion of a suspect's guilt or innocence for the grand jury's conclusions on the evidence would transfer to him a power confided to
them in distortion of the criminal process. On the other hand, while
27.

in ABA, THE ADMINISTRATION
(1974).
28. The claim of a similar Robert Morgenthau-Roy Cohn feud stimulating the criminal
prosecutions of the latter did not raise the suggestion that a special prosecutor be appointed
to supersede Morgenthau as United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.
29. Any promises made to the witness regarding the disposition of his indictment or the
leniency of his sentence, if he pleads guilty, is of course the proper subject of cross-examination and argument to the jury.STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 1.2

OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 84

30.

FREEDMAN 85.

19761

LA WYERS' ETHICS

it is true that a grand jury of laymen invariably turns to the prosecutor for legal guidance in weighing the sufficiency of the evidence
for an indictment, the ultimate conclusion is exclusively the jury's
to draw, and an honest impersonal appraisal of the evidence by the
prosecutor is all that should be ethically required of him.
Moreover, grand juries are not legally required to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order to indict, but only "probable
cause" to believe that such guilt exists.3" The Code of Professional
Responsibility also requires only that the charges be supported by
"probable cause." 3 Disagreeing with these legal and ethical standards, Freedman would not only apply the personal "reasonable
doubt" test proposed, but would also impose a sanction that "a
prosecutor should be professionally disciplined for proceeding with
prosecution if a fair-minded person could not reasonably conclude,
on the facts known to the prosecutor, that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."33 But what "fair-minded person" is to
search the prosecutor's conscience? The impracticality of this
proposal is obvious: it would afford opportunity for multiple
attacks on indictmentstand on the prosecutor obtaining them,
subjecting him to retroactively applied vague and indefinite ethical
standards in disciplinary proceedings involving disclosure and
appraisal by grievance committees of secret grand jury testimony;
and it would immobilize the prosecutor in a straightjacket of
"ethical" inhibitions.
Freedman next attacks the widely used practice of plea bargaining, and much of his criticism has been voiced by others. There is
no justification for the "overcharge" of a more serious offense than
the evidence warrants simply to coerce a defendant into bargaining
for a plea to a lesser crime. Indeed, there is considerable agitation
generally for the abolition of plea bargaining altogether, 3 although the author does not go that far. He does not mention,
however, the salutary uses of plea bargaining in the solution and
successful prosecution of crimes. Many of the convictions in the
31. See, e.g., Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214 (1965); People v. Karl, 41 App. Div.
2d 1001, 344 N.Y.S. 2d 118 (3d Dep't 1973) (mern.); People v. Martinez, 80 Misc. 2d 735, 364
N.Y.S. 2d 338 (Crim. Ct. 1975); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW 190.65(1) (McKinney 1971). See
generally FED. R. CraIM. P. 4, 5.1, 6, 7.
32. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 7-103(A).
33. FREEDMAN 88.
34. See, e.g., Illegitimacy of Plea Bargaining,FEDERAL PROBATION, Sept. 1974, at 18.
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Watergate conspiracy, for example, would have been hardly possible but for the testimony of John Dean, although given only after
intensive plea bargaining and the granting of testimonial immunity.
In the trial of an indictment, Freedman would forbid the prosecutor to use prior convictions of the defendant on cross-examination
-a practice which he regards as a "species of unethical coercion"
preventing the defendant from taking the stand in his own defense.
Thus, solely for a testifying convict's benefit, the jurors are to be
deprived by "ethical" fiat of a long recognized test of credibility.
Other well-directed criticism is leveled at the prosecution's use of
the perjured testimony of policemen, which the author claims goes
unpunished and undisciplined-a result he attributes to the close
relationship between police and prosecutor in the performance of
their respective duties. But here again his suggested "obvious solution" is excessive:3 5
In any case involving charges of police abuse. . . a special prosecutor, who
is not in a daily working relaiionship with the police, should be appointed to
handle both the police officer's charge against the citizen and the citizen's
charge against the officer.

But would not such a solution encourage routine charges of police
brutality as an easy means to procure disqualification of the prosecutor and the appointment of a special prosecutor in his place? And
would it not also require preliminary hearings of the police abuse
accusation and of the alleged disqualifying relationship between the
particular prosecutor and the police, before any trial on the merits
of the crime with which the defendant is charged? These convoluted
proceedings would further increase delays in the trial of criminal
cases, which defendants and the public alike deplore.
The remainder of the book considers such perennially controversial problems as (1) certification of trial lawyers (labeled a "dubious
remedy" for professional incompetence, but reluctantly found acceptable if applied to those now practicing as well as those newly
admitted); (2) liberalization of the ethical limitations restricting
lawyer advertising;" and (3) the comparative merits, ethical and
35: FREEDMAN 93.
36. The American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
has recently proposed changes to the Code of Professional Responsibility which would permit
lawyers to advertise in a restricted manner. ABA, Legal Profession Is Considering Code
Amendments to Permit Restricted Advertising by Lawyers, 62 A.B.A.J. 53 (1976).
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professional, of the British and American Bars. 7
In closing, the repeated exposure of Freedman's unorthodox positions no longer serves to shock, alarm, or inform the legal profession.
However, the publication of this work at this particular time seems
most unfortunate; for it makes the author's peculiarly lax ethical
standards accessible to the general public, who are not likely to
appraise them with a critical eye, and whose present confidence in
and respect for the legal profession, now perhaps as its slimiest
bottom in the backwash of Watergate, will hardly be elevated by
this heterodoxy which approves as permissible and indeed mandatory, practices traditionally and rightfully condemned as unethical."
37. With regard to this last topic, the author finds that the claimed superiority of the
"English" bar is a "myth," and estimates that in "litigating ability . . . barristers, as a
group, are inferior to litigating attorneys in the United States." FREEDMAN 111. Before a
sweeping generality of this kind may gain acceptance, far more data than the author's "research" has unearthed will be required, and even then only the most temerarious would
venture such an odious comparison.
38. This Review has-considered the principal subjects covered by 125 pages of text. The
remainder of the book consists of an appendix which includes the author's annotated version
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

